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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY 
AT LOUISVILLE 
CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:09-CV-828-H 
DANIEL E. GESEGNET PLAINTIFF 
V. 
J.B. HUNT TRANSPORT, INC. DEFENDANT 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Plaintiff, Daniel E. Gesegnet, claims that Defendant, J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc. (“Hunt”), 
discriminated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the 
Kentucky Civil Rights Act, and also defamed him.1 
This case presents an unusual set of circumstances. Plaintiff is claiming that Defendant 
failed to accommodate him in ways unrelated to job performance during the hiring process. In 
fact, there is no suggestion that Plaintiff would require or even request an accommodation for his 
actual work. Consequently, there are no readily available models for analyzing this claim. 
Hunt has moved for summary judgment. Thereafter, the Court reviewed the memoranda 
and discussed the case with counsel during a conference. For the reasons that follow, the Court 
will sustain the motion. 
I. 
The parties seem to agree upon the material facts. In early 2007, Plaintiff applied to be 
an independent contractor tractor trailer driver with Hunt. Initially, Plaintiff spoke with a Hunt 
employee, Patrick Peoples, about the employment process. During this conversation, Plaintiff 
1Hunt has argued for summary judgment on both claims. Plaintiff did not respond to Hunt’s argument 
regarding the defamation claim. The Court will assume Plaintiff has decided to no longer pursue this claim. 
told Peoples that he had a heart attack in 2002 and had received several diagnoses from a 
physician, including bi-polar and anxiety disorders. He discussed his aversion to being in small 
spaces with others at some length. Potential Hunt tractor trailer drivers must successfully 
complete orientation, which includes a driving test, a medical questionnaire, a drug screen, and a 
physical exam.2 Plaintiff wanted to ensure that these psychiatric diagnoses would not interfere 
with his new Hunt employee orientation and testing. According to Plaintiff, Peoples reassured 
him that only a few new employees would be in attendance and that he should not be concerned. 
The record does not contain the testimony or opinion of a medical doctor concerning the 
precise nature of Plaintiff’s disability. Plaintiff does offer two different medical forms. One is 
dated 2008 and the other form from the Hunt orientation is dated January 2009. Plaintiff 
believes that he gave Peoples the 2008 copy. Both questionnaires contain a line for “nervous or 
psychiatric disorders, e.g., severe depression.” Below this line is an indented line which requests 
the names of any medications the applicant is taking to treat “nervous or psychiatric disorders.” 
On both questionnaires, the “no” box is checked for “nervous or psychiatric disorders” and the 
“yes” box is checked next to the medication line. 
On January 26, 2009, Plaintiff arrived for the orientation to find about twenty-five 
attendees. He successfully completed his driving test and then went to a clinic for his drug 
screen and physical. Hunt contracted the drug screen and physical examination to Concentra, 
who runs the clinic. Prior to the driving test, attendees were verbally informed that after signing 
in, they could not leave the clinic area until they had given their urine sample for the drug screen. 
The same warning appeared on the clinic door and the clinic sign-in sheet. Leaving the clinic 
2The U.S. Department of Transportation has certain requirements for commercial drivers, which explains 
many of the elements of Hunt’s orientation. 
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area prior to completion of the drug screen is considered a refusal, and therefore a failure of the 
drug screen. After entering the clinic area, Plaintiff may have discussed with a clinic employee 
his problems with confined spaces and may even have asked if he could wait outside. He says 
that he waited for approximately two to three hours in the small, L-shaped waiting room. 
Gerri Norseworthy, a Hunt employee, was the Service Center Safety Manager who 
oversaw the orientation. She was working on computers near the clinic area when she saw 
Plaintiff leaving. She approached him in the doorway to the clinic and re-explained the clinic 
policy. Plaintiff told Norseworthy that he had trouble with small spaces full of people and may 
have stated that he needed to “stand away from the crowd.” Gesegnet Dep. 109:13. 
Norseworthy recalled seeing only a few other orientation attendees in the clinic waiting room 
and requested Plaintiff remain in the clinic area. For the moment, Plaintiff complied. But, when 
another attendee closed the blinds in the waiting room, Plaintiff felt as if the room “just slammed 
shut.” Gesegnet Dep. 111:14. He hurriedly left the clinic, went to the cab of his truck, took 
anxiety medication and made a phone call to Norseworthy. 
During the phone call to Norseworthy, Plaintiff explained that he had a diagnosed 
disorder that caused him to leave the clinic area. Norseworthy reiterated that Plaintiff was 
considered to have refused the drug screen, was therefore ineligible to be hired, and could leave 
the orientation. Because Plaintiff was upset, Norseworthy conferenced in a Hunt human 
resources employee, Kathy Piha. She agreed that Hunt considered Plaintiff to have refused the 
drug screen. Moreover, she said that Hunt could not hire Plaintiff because of the refusal, and 
would publish Plaintiff’s drug screen failure in the DAC report, a report available to other major 
freighting companies. Plaintiff again explained his medical diagnoses to both Piha and 
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Norseworthy. Following this conversation, he called several other Hunt employees, including 
Patrick Peoples, who told him that Norseworthy was the final decision maker and nothing could 
be done. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a complaint with the EEOC and then with this Court. 
II. 
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine 
dispute exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-
moving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “On summary 
judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light 
most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 
655 (1962). While the moving party must demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact 
exists, in response, the non-moving party must move beyond the pleadings and present evidence 
in support of its claim. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). 
Claims under the Kentucky Civil Rights Act are analyzed similarly to claims under the 
ADA. Howard Baer, Inc. v. Schave, 127 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Ky. 2003). The ADA was amended 
in 2008 by the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendment Act (“ADAAA”). Jenkins v. Nat’l 
Bd. Med. Examiners, No. 08-5371, 2009 WL 331638, at *1 (6th Cir. Feb 11, 2009). Because the 
events in question took place after the effective date of the ADAAA, the Court will apply the 
amended act to this case. 
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III. 
Plaintiff claims that Hunt discriminated against him in refusing to reasonably 
accommodate his known disabilities.3 When there is no direct evidence of discrimination, as 
here, courts turn to the familiar burden shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas. Walsh v. 
United Parcel Service, 201 F.3d 718, 715 (6th Cir. 2000). First, Plaintiff must prove a prima 
facie case. The burden then shifts to the defendant to prove, for this claim, that “the employee 
cannot reasonably be accommodated, because the accommodation would impose an undue 
hardship on the operation of its programs.” DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 419 (6th Cir. 2004) 
(quoting Gaines v. Runyon, 107 F.3d 1171, 1175-76 (6th Cir. 1997)).4 The elements of a prima 
facie case are: (1) Plaintiff is disabled, (2) Plaintiff is otherwise qualified for the position with 
Hunt, with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) Hunt knew or had reason to know about 
Plaintiff’s disability; (4) Plaintiff requested an accommodation; and (5) Hunt failed to provide 
the accommodation. Myers v. Cuyahoga Cnty., Ohio, 182 Fed. App’x 510, 515 (6th Cir. 2006) 
(citing DiCarlo, 358 F.3d at 419).5 
Hunt makes a strong argument that Plaintiff does not have a disability as defined by the 
ADAAA and Hunt had no knowledge of Plaintiff’s alleged disability when he violated the clinic 
policy. The Court will consider each issue in this section. 
3
 Plaintiff does not allege a firing or refusal to hire due to a disability. 
4While DiCarlo is a case based upon the Rehabilitation Act, the analysis for claims under the ADA are 
approached similarly. Monette v. Electronic Data Systems Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1177 (6th Cir. 1996). 
5While the elements of a prima facie case of disability discrimination are frequently cited, the elements of a 
prima facie case of discrimination based on failure to accommodate are less frequently utilized. The Sixth Circuit in 
Myers looked to the elements of a failure to accommodate claim under the Rehabilitation Act as outlined in DiCarlo. 
The main difference between the elements of a prima facie case under the ADA as opposed to the Rehabilitation Act 
is element four. Regardless, numerous Sixth Circuit cases have stated that the plaintiff must have requested an 
accommodation. See, e.g., Smith v. Ameritech, 129 F.3d 857, 866 (6th Cir. 1997)(quoting Monette, 90 F.3d at 1183). 
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A. 
A disability is “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more 
major life activities of such individual; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being 
regarded as having such an impairment . . .” 42 U.S.C. §12102(1). Plaintiff argues that he meets 
the definition under either (A) or (B). Hunt accepts that some or all of Plaintiff’s psychiatric 
diagnoses qualify as mental impairments, but argues that his conditions do not substantially limit 
any major life activity. 
Major life activities include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, 
hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, 
reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). The 
ADAAA intended to broaden the scope of those protections and, in fact, states that “[t]he 
definition of disability in this chapter shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of 
individuals under this chapter” and that “[t]he term ‘substantially limits’ shall be interpreted 
consistently with the findings and purposes of the ADA Amendments Act of 2008.” 42 U.S.C. 
§12102 (4) (A) and (B). Specifically, through the amendments, Congress intended to no longer 
require “that to be substantially limited in performing a major life activity under the ADA ‘an 
individual must have an impairment that prevents or severely restricts the individual from doing 
activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.’” Pub. L. No. 110-325 
§2(b)(4) (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002)). 
In difficult cases, a plaintiff usually proves disability through a combination of medical 
evidence and personal testimony detailing the practical impact of that medical condition. Here, 
Plaintiff is lacking in each area. The Court finds no medical evidence which precisely defines 
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that extent of Plaintiff’s disease and the medical limitations due to it. Without a valid medical 
opinion, courts cannot simply assume that a disease or diagnosis has disabling consequences. 
The medical forms fall short of what is necessary. 
Plaintiff’s deposition testimony does not specifically discuss the effects of his psychiatric 
diagnoses on “major life activities.” Hunt points to this absence of discussion along with 
Plaintiff’s employment history as evidence that Plaintiff’s “mental impairments” do not 
“substantially limit” any “major life activity.” However, Plaintiff attached an affidavit to his 
Response to Motion for Summary Judgment in which he states: “my psychological impairments 
substantially impair several major life activities. These include thinking, concentrating, learning, 
interacting with others, sleeping, and working.” Plaintiff further elaborates that he chose to drive 
trucks for a living because he “would not have to frequently interact with people,” that he “did 
not complete high school partly because I was unable to sit in a full classroom and learn,” that he 
avoids certain social settings and encounters, and that he is dependent on certain medications for 
emotional stability and sleep. 
This affidavit is mostly devoid of specific examples of major life impairments and mostly 
contains conclusory generalizations about his inability to perform basic functions. The Court 
doubts that the medical and personal evidence here is sufficient to show an actual inability to 
perform a basic function of life. Nevertheless, given the broad definition of disability Congress 
intended, the Court will assume that Plaintiff has a disability under the ADAAA.6 
B. 
Hunt argues that it had no knowledge of Plaintiff’s alleged disability at the time he 
6The Court will, therefore, not address Plaintiff’s argument that Plaintiff is disabled because he has a 
“record of impairment.” 42 U.S.C. §12102(1)(B). 
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violated clinic policy and that Plaintiff was too late informing it of his disability to be due a 
reasonable accommodation. The Court will consider the sufficiency of the information Plaintiff 
provided to Hunt. 
Plaintiff had a discussion with Patrick Peoples prior to orientation. During that 
conversation, Peoples “was [made] aware of the whole entire thing with the psychiatrist and 
everything else” because Plaintiff “didn’t want any complications when driving five hundred 
miles to Louisville. . .” Gesegnet Depo 129: 4-6 and 9-11. Later at the clinic door, Plaintiff 
claims to have informed Norseworthy about his problems with small rooms and lots of people. 
Last, he shared this information about his psychiatric diagnoses in the same conversation in 
which Norseworthy concluded that Hunt would not hire Plaintiff. 
The question is whether the employer “knew or had reason to know of Plaintiff’s 
disability.” Myers, 182 Fed. App’x at 515. Case law is unclear whether Defendant must know 
the actual diagnoses. Hammon v DHL Airways, Inc., 980 F.Supp. 919, 926 (S.D. Ohio 1997) 
(stating that “[t]he employer need only know the ‘underlying facts’ of the condition,” not the 
diagnosis); but see Van Compernolle v. City of Zeeland, No. 1:05-CV-133, 2006 WL1460035 at 
*12 (W.D. Mich. May 24, 2006) (finding that knowledge of symptoms but not diagnosis or 
condition is insufficient “knowledge” for employer liability) (citing Hedberg v. Ind. Bell Tel. 
Co., Inc., 47 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 1995)). However, it is clear that Plaintiff must inform Defendant 
of limitations that result from the disability. 42 U.S.C. §12112(b)(5)(A) and Matuska v. 
Hinckley Twp., 56 F.Supp.2d 906, 917 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (“the ADA only requires employers to 
accommodate the known physical or mental limitations of the employee.”). Plaintiff makes 
vague contentions of fully informing Peoples of his disabilities, but the Court has been presented 
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with no specific information Plaintiff provided to Peoples. 
It is also far from clear that the decision-maker, Norseworthy, knew about the disability 
before Plaintiff violated the clinic policy. See Hill v. Kansas City Area Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 
891 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding summary judgment appropriate for employer in part where plaintiff 
“never told KCATA supervisors that the medications she was taking in mid-1995 left her 
uncontrollably drowsy on the job until after she committed the offense of twice sleeping on the 
job, a work rule violation she knew would mandate her discharge”). Though the Court may infer 
knowledge from Peoples to Norseworthy, see Thomas v. Mech. Consultants, Inc., 655 F.Supp.2d 
756, 762-63 (W.D.Ky. 2009), there are no facts upon which such an inference might be based. 
Moreover, Norseworthy learned most of the information about Plaintiff’s diagnoses and 
limitations when telling him that he could not be hired. Reason dictates that a plaintiff must 
“have informed his employer of his disability and requested an accommodation prior to the time 
at which an employer takes adverse action against a disabled employee.” Jakubowski v. Christ 
Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195 (6th Cir. 2010) (Cole, J., concurring). The unusual circumstances and 
lack of case law directly on point make it difficult to determine if Hunt had sufficient reason to 
know of Plaintiff’s disability. 
IV. 
Regardless of the preceding analysis, Plaintiff must have proposed a reasonable 
accommodation to Hunt with sufficient specificity. Lockard v. Gen. Motors Corp., 52 Fed. 
App’x 782, 788 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that “[t]he burden remains on the employee to request an 
accommodation”); Walsh v. United Parcel Service, 201 F.3d 718 (upholding award of summary 
judgment to Defendant because the plaintiff did not request a reasonable accommodation). “The 
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employer is not required to speculate as to the extent of the employee’s disability or the 
employee’s need or desire for an accommodation.” Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143 
F.3d 1042, 1046-47 (6th Cir. 1998). 
Plaintiff did discuss his concerns and issues with Peoples. He told Norseworthy that he 
was having difficulty in a small space with lots of other people and needed to “stand away from 
the crowd,” and may have asked a clinic employee if he could wait somewhere besides the 
waiting room.7 While the Court has assumed that Plaintiff informed Peoples of his diagnoses 
and apprehensions, at best, Plaintiff only claims he may have made vague suggestions or 
requests for accommodation. Plaintiff’s subsequent ability to remain in the waiting room for 
several hours confirms the non-clarity of any need for accommodation. Even after Plaintiff left 
the clinic, he made no such request. See id. at 1047 (suggesting Plaintiff could have requested 
accommodation after termination decision was made). 
The Sixth Circuit has concluded that a request to transfer to a position “in a well-
ventilated and allergen-free workstation that would not ‘trigger asthma or cause a drop in peak 
flow’” was too vague an accommodation request to support a failure to accommodate claim. 
Cassidy v. Detroit Edison Co., 138 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff may have requested 
he “stand away from the crowd,” a request, if actually made, with less specificity than the 
request at issue in Cassidy. The First Circuit not only requires that a request be “direct and 
specific,” but also include an explanation of the link between the disability and the request. 
Freadman v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 484 F.3d 91, 102 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting Reed v. 
7
 Plaintiff does not remember if he did make such a request. Even if he did, the request was possibly to a 
clinic employee, an employee of Concentra. Plaintiff does not rely on this possible request in his argument to deny 
Hunt’s motion for summary judgment. For these reasons, along with the vague nature of the request, the Court will 
not consider this a request for accommodation. 
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LePage Bakeries, Inc., 244 F.3d 254, 261 (1st Cir. 2001)). 
The Court concludes that no request by Plaintiff, if any were made, was specific and 
direct nor is there sufficient information upon which Defendant could infer the link between 
vague comments or requests and Plaintiff’s psychiatric diagnoses. For this reason, Plaintiff’s 
claim must fail. 
V. 
This case presents many difficulties in its analysis. Regardless of these difficulties, it 
seems an impossible case to make. 
Prior to beginning the orientation process, Plaintiff did not affirmatively assert his 
inability to await his drug test in a small room. There could be many reasons for this, perhaps 
because Plaintiff did not know the size of the room. In any event, Plaintiff actually remained in 
the room for several hours. 
By the time Plaintiff made his call to Norseworthy asking more directly for an 
accommodation, the circumstances were changed. By this time Plaintiff had already violated a 
firm rule prohibiting applicants from leaving the drug test room. At that point, Hunt disqualified 
Plaintiff for objectively truthful reasons: the violation of a valid orientation rule designed to 
preserve the validity of drug test results. 
Finally, it is not clear that Plaintiff is prevented from reapplying to Hunt or that Hunt 
would prohibit his future application. What is certain is that Plaintiff did not reapply for the 
Hunt job. Instead, Plaintiff applied for and obtained an entirely different job. 
The Court will enter an order consistent with this Memorandum Opinion. 
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May 23, 2011 
cc: Counsel of Record 
John G. Heyburn II, Judge 
United States District Court 
